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THE WAR IN DARFUR AND THE TRANSFORMATION 
OF THE AUTHORITARIAN COALITION
ABSTRACT
Authoritarian regimes are often considered to be prone to civil wars because they are fundamentally based on principles of marginalization 
and coercion. Recent literature on authoritarian resiliency tends nonetheless 
to consider that regimes that are plagued with violence cannot endure over 
the long term. Building on an analysis of Omar al-Bashir’s regime in Sudan, 
this paper explores the relationship between civil wars and the winning coali-
tion, the group of people whose loyalty is necessary for the survival of the 
regime. It studies the way in which the war in Darfur has been fought, and 
demonstrates how this has led to changes within the coalition that may con-
tribute to the entrenchment of authoritarianism in Sudan. 
In May 2008, for the irst time in the history of Sudan, a rebel movement 
reached the gates of the capital city. Darfur’s Justice and Equality Movement 
(JEM) had brought the war from the periphery to the economic and political 
centre of the country. The assault was pushed back, but it was nonetheless a 
sign that a regime that had long seemed unshakeable might actually be 
weaker than had previously been thought. 
The current regime was established in June 1989, following a coup d’état 
orchestrated by the National Islamic Front (NIF) and carried out by a faction of 
army oficers, among whom was Omar al-Bashir. It was only after a few weeks, 
however, that Sudanese and foreign observers alike understood the major role 
played by the Islamists, who were led by Hassan al-Turabi. The newly-estab-
lished regime did not shy away from using violence. People were forced out of 
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their jobs, demonstrations at the University of Khartoum were repressed, and 
most importantly, the secret services were reformed. This organization, which 
was initially renamed IS-SOR and is now known as the NISS, became one of 
the cornerstones of the regime’s rule, and the infamous “ghost houses”, secret 
prisons where opponents were sent to be killed and/or tortured, were created 
(International Crisis Group 2011: 60). Those early years of violence have left 
an enduring legacy among the Sudanese, especially as the regime has been 
careful to demonstrate its ruthlessness time and time again 1. 
Adding to this form of political violence, the war was also reignited in the 
country’s provinces in the south and east and in the western province of 
Darfur. While their root causes are complex, and can sometimes be found in 
local disputes, there is little doubt that these conlicts are the consequence of 
a mixture of economic and political marginalization, with an added layer of 
cultural discrimination and racism arising from the regime’s policies of 
Islamization and Arabization 2. Indeed, Omar al-Bashir’s government has long 
been accused of fuelling these wars while carefully protecting its backbone, 
which is Khartoum and the nether riverine regions from which most of Sudan’s 
elites have come since independence in 1956. In the end, conlicts come and 
go in Sudan one after the other, but still Bashir stands strong in Khartoum, and 
his re-election in April 2015, although plagued by suspicions, has conirmed 
his grip on power. 
That said, his longevity in the face of adversity from a multiplicity of rebel 
groups is rather odd, especially since many of them have identiied the regime 
as the source of Sudan’s problems, both political and economic. It was, for 
instance, the main topic of the mysterious “Black Book”, whose writers called 
themselves ‘The Seekers of Truth and Justice’, which was disseminated around 
Khartoum in 2010. It contains an abundance of data and facts about the mar-
ginalization of every periphery in the country (Flint and de Waal 2008: 16), 
echoing the “New Sudan” discourse that was propagated by the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), the main southern rebel movement, 
although it eventually turned its back on it when it signed the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005. Despite its name, the CPA did not include 
any rebel movements from Darfur, or from anywhere else for that matter. 
In this article, I question the relationship between civil wars and authori-
tarian resilience. I attempt to go beyond the notion that these wars are threats 
that the regime must overcome in order to survive, and follow De Waal in 
exploring the existence of structured governance systems in areas and times 
of turbulence (de Waal 2016). Looking at the transformative effects of the war 
1. In September 2013, the regime violently repressed demonstrations in the country’s 
main cities. In Khartoum, the security forces reportedly killed more than 200 people. 
2. Policies such as these had also been implemented by previous regimes, but they 
have been intensiied under al-Bashir’s rule. 
139
THRIVING ON CHAOS
on the “winning coalition” (de Mesquita and al. 2005), the small group whose 
loyalty keeps the autocrat in power, I argue that civil wars provide autocrats 
with opportunities. More speciically, they represent a moment when auto-
crats can ind and groom new members of their coalitions in a way that 
entrenches their power. To develop this argument, I focus on the war in Darfur, 
and rely on both preliminary data collected during a ield trip in Khartoum in 
early 2015 and secondary sources. Interviews were conducted with Darfuri 
oficials, members of the opposition parties, and rebel movements, as well as 
with civil society actors. Research conducted in authoritarian contexts faces 
speciic challenges, such as limitations on what informants are able to say 
without taking risks. It was therefore necessary to gain the interviewees’ trust, 
for instance by ensuring the anonymity of the process, and to accept rejec-
tion, but also to interpret silences and contradictions during the interviews. 
Another way to improve the quality of the data has been through triangula-
tion, using information that had been provided during other interviews or 
from secondary sources. Within these limitations, the primary aim of this arti-
cle is to explore an argument that may provide an answer to a speciic 
theoretical and empirical puzzle.
The paper is divided into three parts. The irst offers a brief review of the 
literature on the relationship between war and authoritarian regimes, and dis-
cusses how the notion of the winning coalition can be used to comprehend 
the mechanisms that connect them. The second looks at way the war has pro-
ceeded, and introduces a new central actor, the Janjaweed. The last explores 
the impact of the inclusion of this actor on the regime’s strategy, focusing on 
its function within the broader security apparatus. The paper concludes with 
some remarks that question whether the allies the regime has groomed in this 
context are really supportive of it, as there are no unequivocal allies in Sudan.
INVESTIGATING THE FACTORS OF AUTHORITARIAN RESILIENCY: 
WAR AND THE WINNING COALITION
War in the study of authoritarianism
The literature is rather indecisive on the issue of the relationship between 
civil wars and authoritarian resilience, which relates on a broader level to the 
question of the use of violence. The recent renewal of interest in research on the 
topic of authoritarianism, which has been focused mostly on the role of nomi-
nally democratic institutions, has set aside the question of the use of violence. 
This decision has been justiied by the idea that authoritarianisms after the third 
wave of democratization are qualitatively different from their predecessors. For 
many researchers, authoritarianism has transformed itself to respond to the chal-
lenge of the spread of the democratic norm, leading to the appearance of what 
have been coined “hybrid” regimes, which mix democratic and authoritarian 
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traits (Carothers 2002, Diamond 2002, Levitsky and Way 2002). Furthermore, 
these regimes are starkly distinct from the forms of extreme personalization of 
power – such as those practiced by Idi Amin Dada and Jean-Bedel Bokassa – 
that were common during the immediate post-independence period. There are 
also nowadays fewer military regimes, which used to be the most common type 
of non-democratic system (Tripp 2004). These regimes were characterized by 
their use of violence, an area in which they possessed a comparative advantage 
(Fjelde 2010). According to Tripp (2004), authoritarianism has softened, and 
Picard (2008) seems to concur when she writes that most autocrats seek to avoid 
using violence, instead implementing strategies aimed at internalization of the 
balance of power. Analyses of authoritarianism have therefore moved away 
from deinitions that postulate an afinity between violence and authoritarian-
ism (see especially Médard 1991) towards deinitions that function more as 
typologies built upon criteria of “who governs” (see, for instance, Geddes 2003 
and Geddes 2004). Some authors, such as Svolik, nonetheless still highlight the 
continued importance of violence, though often as a background feature: “polit-
ical power in dictatorships, even when nominally exercised through political 
institutions, must be ultimately backed by a credible threat of violence (Svolik 
2009: 479)”. It has also been argued that violence is a counter-productive strat-
egy, especially when used indiscriminately: if an individual cannot avoid a 
regime’s violence by remaining inactive, he or she is much more likely to join 
the opposition (Zahar and Saideman 2008; Kalyvas 2006; Cai 2008). A regime 
can therefore end up threatening itself: “Repression may work in the short run, 
as it raises the cost of dissent. But dissent delayed can be much stronger and 
more violent (Saideman et Zahar 2008:11-12)”. 
Furthermore, authoritarianism that uses too high a level of violence 
exposes itself to international sanctions that might endanger the regime 
through their economic effects (see, for instance, Brownlee 2002). This idea of 
violence as a double-edged sword can be linked to the debate in the literature 
on civil wars between proponents of an approach that describes violence as a 
form of hubris and authors who consider it to be instrumental: that is, some-
thing actors can use to reach their political or military goals (Valentino 2014). 
As De Waal explains, both cases do coexist in a speciic political marketplace 
that is deined as “a system of governance run on the basis of personal trans-
actions in which political services and allegiances are exchanged for material 
reward in a competitive manner” (De Waal 2016: 1). Sometimes, violence 
will be used as a tool to enhance someone’s position, and sometimes it will 
“arise from error” (De Waal 2016: 3), when one participant misjudges the 
rivals or the market. 
In order to move beyond these debates, there is a need for more case stud-
ies that highlight the exact mechanisms by which violence and authoritarian 
resiliency are connected. It may be especially fruitful to connect the use of 
violence, whatever form it may take, to other resiliency factors that are investi-
gated in the literature. Gerschewski, for instance, has provided a model of the 
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interrelations between what he calls the “three pillars of stability” – legitima-
tion, repression and co-optation – demonstrating how one can reinforce the 
other (Gerschewski 2013), and yet his use of the concept of repression places 
violence in the form of civil war outside his framework. Indeed, most research 
on authoritarianism, including those I have quoted above, addresses violence 
by referring to repression and forgetting about civil war, despite the fact that 
the line separating these two phenomena is often blurred. Here, I propose to 
consider civil war as a form of violence that may play the same role as repres-
sion in an authoritarian context, as both forms of violence can overlap. Civil 
wars, according to Kalyvas, are a type of “armed combat within the bounda-
ries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject to a common 
authority at the outset of the hostilities” (Kalyvas 2006: 5). They are complex 
processes involving micro and macro struggles. One of the factions is usually 
the State’s armed forces, which are part of a broader security apparatus that 
includes the secret services and multiple police organizations. While the latter 
are often considered to be the force that implements repression, the roles are 
not usually as clear-cut, just as the transition from a local insurrection that can 
be repressed to a full-blown civil war that needs to be fought is more a matter 
of a political framing process than it is a mechanical one. Civil war, I argue, is 
both an externality of authoritarian politics and a governance strategy in itself, 
as it can lead to transformations within the winning coalition. 
The winning coalition
The concept of the winning coalition has become somewhat ubiquitous in 
the North American literature on authoritarian politics. It has been borrowed 
from De Mesquita, Bruce and Siverson’s research, in which they argue that 
every regime type needs to preserve the loyalty of the group to which it owes 
its power – the winning coalition – which is part of a larger group called the 
selectorate. In order to maintain this loyalty, leaders can choose to distribute 
either private goods, which are only given to members of the coalition, or 
public goods, which reach the totality of the selectorate by means of state pol-
icies. In democracies, the winning coalition is made up of the entire 
selectorate, as the leader is chosen through elections and universal suffrage. 
These regimes will therefore rely more on the implementation of public poli-
cies (De Mesquita, Bruce and al. 2003: 8). The opposite applies in authoritarian 
regimes, where the winning coalition will be limited to a small group. 
Identifying with precision who is part of a winning coalition in authoritar-
ian contexts can prove rather dificult, not only because the coalition evolves 
over time, but also because secrecy often prevails, and people who appear to 
have power may sometimes be puppets in the hands of others. The process of 
identifying a coalition may be easier in hybrid regimes that organize electoral 
processes, digged as they may be. Looking at who is allowed to participate 
and who is allowed to win can give an idea of the individuals and the broader 
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category of people whose support is deemed necessary by the autocrat. It is 
also possible to look at the members of key institutions, although it would irst 
be necessary to clearly identify where the locus of power lies. Another solution 
is to investigate co-optation practices, more speciically the distribution of 
goods and privileges, which again show whose loyalty is being nurtured. De 
Juan and Bank’s research on which area of Syria still had electricity despite a 
period of power shortages highlights one of the many ways to identify if not 
who exactly the members of the winning coalition are, but at least the portions 
of the population that are favoured by the regime (De Juan and Bank 2015). 
Finally, it is important to incorporate the dynamic dimension of these coali-
tions into our analysis. Authoritarian regimes do not always rely on the same 
strategy or the same groups to maintain power. As they are confronted with 
challenges, both internal and external, autocrats who are able to have a luid 
coalition, one that can evolve to respond to these challenges, are best placed 
to avoid being overthrown. Indeed, the transformation of many regimes into 
hybrid regimes signals this capacity to retain power through an ability to adapt. 
The argument presented here is that in the case of Sudan, the war in Darfur 
presented a challenge that was overcome because of the regime’s ability to 
transform its winning coalition. This was not done as a response to the war, 
however; it was achieved through the war itself, meaning that there is a strong 
congruence between strategies implemented to win wars and resiliency strat-
egies. Whether these strategies achieve their aims is not necessarily relevant 
here, as my purpose is not to reconstruct the connection between actors’ sup-
posed goals and their “end results” a posteriori 3, but to investigate the 
processes in order to highlight certain “situational logics” (Dobry 2007). 
Therefore, while I recognize the capacity of actors to actually devise strate-
gies, I also take into account the possibility that these strategies may have an 
impact on processes other than the ones they were intended to inluence. 
FIGHTING THE WAR IN DARFUR
The root causes of the conlict: the convergence of micro and macro 
struggles
This civil war, which oficially started in 2003, is still under way, despite 
the fact that a peace agreement – the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur 
(DDPD) – was signed in 2011. It is not my purpose here to dwell on the 
sources of the conlict, which are especially intricate, but I will attempt to 
offer a quick overview of the events that I hope will do justice to this 
3. For a thorough critique of analyses that focus on actors’ intentionality and their 
depiction of the relationship between agents and structures, see Dobry 2007. 
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complexity. While Darfur only became the theatre of a full-blown civil war in 
2003, the roots of the conlict go back to the development policies imple-
mented since independence in 1956, which have marginalized the region. 
Tensions reached new heights in the 1980s, when Darfur was affected by 
drought. This was nothing new in itself, but it was combined with a national 
economic crisis that crippled the advance of Darfur’s commercial economy, 
which had been progressing in preceding decades (De Waal 1989: 78). This 
situation resulted in population movements from one area of Darfur to 
another, as well as to other parts of the country. Most importantly, nomadic 
Arabs 4 and members of the Zaghawa group travelled towards less affected 
areas such as Jebel Mara. Disputes multiplied as “movements to other dars 5 
and the lack of respect for the traditional system of organizing this movement 
led to confrontation” (El-Battahani 2009: 46). Faced with growing tensions, 
many groups began to arm themselves and build their own militias 
(El-Battahani 2009: 46). It is important to underscore that these quarrels did 
not systematically oppose Arabs and non-Arabs, and that the ethnic groups 
that populate Darfur should not be considered to be completely homogene-
ous communities. As a matter of fact, many of the actors in the conlict 
straddled the borders between different identities quite easily. Nonetheless, 
various Arab groups came together at the end of the 1980s, uniting for a war 
against the Fur (1987-1989). They formed a political block called the Arab 
Gathering that was inluenced by the pro-Arab ideology that was being prop-
agated by the Libyan government at the time (de Waal 2004: 720). This is this 
period during which the Janjaweed started to appear as a more or less cohe-
sive group, the word itself traditionally referring to gangs of outlaws from 
neighbouring Chad (Flint and de Waal 2008: 36). According to Mamdani, the 
Janjaweed began as an armed militia supplied by the Arab camel nomad 
groups who formed a minority within the organization (Mamdani 2010: 231). 
What ignited the spark at a local level in 2003 was the fact that certain 
nomadic groups were failing to respect the traditional migration routes that 
had been agreed with the farmers –mainly Fur, in this case – under the super-
vision of the local authorities (interview, Darfur Regional Authority (DRA) 
member, Khartoum, March 10 2015). The incident quickly escalated into kill-
ings and raids, and it was when these small-scale quarrels intersected with 
national politics that they turned into a full-blown civil war. The appearance 
of two movements that began to articulate their grievances in terms similar to 
the SPLM/A’s discourse played a major role in this process. They were a 
response to the longstanding dismissive attitudes and marginalizing policies 
4. This term and others referring to various identity categories and groups are com-
monly used in the literature on Darfur, but should not be considered from an 
essentialist perspective, as they are historical and political constructs (Vezzadini 2011). 
5. “Dars” is the name given to a tribe’s homeland in Darfur.
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that had been implemented by the centre since colonial times and were then 
pursued by al-Bashir’s regime (El Battahani 2009: 55). The irst, the Sudan 
Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A), had the support of the SPLM/A, and was 
composed mostly of Zaghawa and Fur and to a lesser extent of members of 
the Masalit, Beri, and Meido groups. The appearance of the second move-
ment, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), was related to struggles within 
the regime’s winning coalition. 
In 1999, the alliance between the Islamists led by Turabi and factions of the 
military led by Bashir came to an end. The policies promoted by the NIF were 
unsustainable, especially because Turabi’s insistence on making Sudan the 
centre of a global Islamist revival movement ended up isolating the country on 
the international stage (Marchal and Messiant 1995). Even its closest allies, the 
Saudis, became wary of it when the government welcomed Osama Ben Laden 
to Khartoum. As funding from donors and international organizations dried up 
and embargos were implemented, Sudan’s economic situation became dire. In 
1999, Turabi made his move to become the elected leader of the nation, and 
attempted to sideline Bashir. It did not work. Bashir used his hold on the army 
to exclude Turabi and his followers from the political game, and Turabi was 
placed under house arrest. But he did not disappear from the national stage 
completely : he created a new party, the Popular Congress Party (PCP), which 
joined the ranks of the opposition (Burr and Collins 2003; Ahmed 2009). This 
marginalization of the Islamist old guard fuelled the conlict in Darfur. 
Displeased with the situation, members of the PCP generated unrest in the 
western provinces in order to destabilize the regime, and though Turabi denies 
it, it is said that he is behind the creation of the JEM, or is at least one of its 
main sponsors (El Battahani 2009: 66; Flint and de Waal 2008). 
Both these movements contributed towards taking the conlict to a new 
level, as their grievances were actually a criticism of Sudanese governance 
overall. They protested against the marginalization of the region, and 
demanded improved distribution of wealth and power. In this attempt to 
address national-level issues, they downplayed the importance of ethnic divi-
sions (Flint and de Waal 2008: 16). It is also probably no coincidence that 
these movements appeared at a time when the negotiations between the 
SPLM/A and the government had begun to gain momentum. Some Darfuri 
politicians may have thought the moment was right to present similar claims, 
as the negotiations might be a sign the regime had been weakened. 
The Janjaweed as the cornerstone of the government’s strategy
The two rebel movements, especially the SLA/M, quickly achieved their 
irst successes on the ground. To counter them, the government decided to 
recruit militias from among the Arab groups, relying on a strategy the 
regime – but also the preceding ones, including during the democratic inter-
lude (1986-1989) – had already used in the south (Flint and de Waal 2008: 
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23). This had the advantage of allowing the regime to argue on the interna-
tional stage that it was clearly not ighting a war in Darfur. This form of 
sub-contracting was also a cheap way to ight the war, at a time when the 
government’s inances were strained by a lengthy conlict in the south that 
had reached a stalemate: retirement and other beneits do not need to be 
offered to militiamen as they do in the case of members of the Sudan Armed 
Forces (SAF), and no contracts are signed (interview, retired army oficer, 
Khartoum, April 28 2015). In order to lead this war on its behalf, the govern-
ment identiied key personalities, of whom the main – and most infamous – one 
was Musa Hilal. The sheikh of the nomadic Arab Mahameed group, Hilal 
established his headquarters in the area of Misteriha in North Darfur in the 
mid-1990s, leaving Aamo, the town where his father had established himself 
in 1973 and used to hold court. In little more than a decade, Misteriha 
became a military base where Hilal’s men were trained (Flint and de Waal 
2008: 38). He had already been involved in the ighting before the conlict 
broke out, and had ties with the then-Governor of North Darfur, General 
Abdallah Sai el Nur. He had also been a leader of the Arab Gathering, a coa-
lition of Arab groups, since the 1990s (HRWA 2005: 12). The next Governor, 
Lieutenant-General Ibrahim Suleiman Hassan, apparently found Hilal too 
troublesome, and concerned about the increasing tensions in Darfur, he 
detained him and sent him to prison in Port Sudan, on the other side of the 
country. According to Human Rights Watch, this led to a decline in the num-
ber of attacks committed by the Janjaweed (HRWA 2005: 13). 
After SLA/M’s initial victories, however, Hilal was liberated, and Suleiman 
was removed from his post by the President. The Sheikh settled in the 
Kebkabiya area, where he organized meetings during which he ordered his 
fellow tribesmen to attack non-Arab villages (HRWA 2005: 12-13). Although 
exactly what was promised to the ighters cannot be known with certainty, the 
ighting offered them the opportunity to make what they were trying to take 
since the 1980s theirs: land. This pressing issue had been the reason behind 
attacks from one group or another in many parts of Darfur since the 1960s, 
following waves of migration from the northern areas, which were affected by 
drought, and from neighbouring Chad that increased the pressure on available 
farmland (Abdul-Jalil and Unruh 2013: 166–167). The issue was exacerbated 
by various land reforms, such as the 1970 Unregistered Land Act, which stated 
that all land that was not registered at that date belonged to the government, 
and the abolition of the custom-based Native Administration in 1971. These 
reforms allowed the newcomers to claim land rights, disregarding the custom-
ary rules that had previously regulated the allocation of land among groups 
(Abdu-Jalil and Unruh 2013: 166-167). The government’s intervention in the 
division of Dars in Western Darfur in the 1990s increased tensions, leading to 
“a devastating ethnic conlict and widespread insecurity” (Abdul-Jalil 2006: 
16), and a state of emergency was declared in Western Darfur from 1995 to 
1999. As Kalyvas reminds us, the relationship between the national framing of 
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a civil war and people’s motivations on the ground is a complex one, as more 
often than not “individual and local actors take advantage of the war to settle 
local or private conlicts often bearing little or no relation to the causes of the 
war or the goals of the belligerents (2003: 475–476)”. Darfur is a textbook 
case in this respect: not only did the JEM and SLA/M frame a ight that had its 
origins in very local situations in terms of a national governance issue, but 
there was also a mutually beneicial alliance between certain Arab groups and 
the government. It is important to mention, however, that not all groups con-
tributed to the Janjaweed, and that many people opposed this strategy. In any 
event, from then on, the Janjaweed began to act in coordination with govern-
ment forces, which provided weapons and logistical support. 
Testimonies collected by Human Rights Watch describe the attacks as joint 
army-militia endeavours: “In many cases, villages were irst heavily bombed, 
then the Janjaweed and army ground forces moved in, again with aerial sup-
port, to ensure the “cleaning up” of any remaining civilian presence (2005: 
19)”. Antonov aircraft, helicopters and Sudanese military vehicles were regu-
larly spotted alongside the camel-riding Janjaweed (HRWA 2005, 16). Both 
sides have denied any such coordination. Hilal blamed the SAF for the attacks, 
claiming he was “only a coordinator for the Popular Defence Force”, as “train-
ing, uniforms, and guns are the responsibility of the military people” (HRWA 
2005: 19). The government, on the other hand, denied its involvement with 
the Janjaweeed (de Waal 2004: 724). Despite these claims, the relationship 
between the regime and Hilal was obvious, and his frequent round-trips to 
Khartoum left few doubts. According to Tubiana, the relationship between the 
Janjaweed and the central government involved three levels of authority: 
the local tribal leader, Hilal, who was – at least at the beginning of the 
conlict – not much more than a mere underling; 
local politicians and/or military men from Darfur, who were closer to the 
epicentre of power in Khartoum.
the regime hardliners (2005: 176). 
One of the people whom many consider to be responsible for organizing 
the Janjaweed at a higher level is Ahmed Haroun, who was Minister of the 
Interior at the time. He is currently the subject of a warrant issued by the 
International Criminal Court – as is Bashir – for his involvement in the war.
THE JANJAWEED AND THE SECURITY APPARATUS
A counterbalancing strategy
As mentioned previously, the government’s reliance on militias to ight its 
war in Darfur is not a new strategy. It had already been used in the South, fuel-
ling divisions within the rebel movements by pitting one group against the 
other, and while Bashir’s regime does have a long history of creating militias, 
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the same policy was also implemented by Sadiq al-Mahdi in 1986, when he 
“established militias to counteract the NIF militia and to serve in the war 
against the SPLA” (Salih 2005: 8–9). This process of creating militias can be 
interpreted as part of a counterbalancing strategy. As early as 1989, the new 
leadership had created a paramilitary militia called the People’s Defense Force 
(PDF). This was arguably Turabi’s idea, the aim being to create an armed force 
that would be loyal to the NIF, as opposed to the SAF, which, Turabi apparently 
claimed, was too secularized to be completely devoted to his project (Burr 
and Collins 2003: 193). It is therefore necessary to understand the appearance 
of the PDF in the broader context of the regime’s inside politics, with Turabi 
and Bashir’s dual governance. The early years of the regime also saw the rising 
importance of the security services. Well-trained and well-inanced, the pres-
ence of the NISS is pervasive in the lives of many Sudanese. While it is very 
dificult to ind reliable information about the inner workings of the regime, 
even more so in the case of the security apparatus, it is said that the NISS is not 
only completely independent from the armed forces but also the one organi-
zation that is truly the strong arm of the regime (interview, professor, Khartoum, 
March 25 2015). According to one of the interviewees, during the JEM’s attack 
on Omdurman in 2008, the SAF ended up being caught between the rebels 
and the NISS’s forces, who launched their attack without any consideration for 
the military and decimated their ranks (interview, retired army oficer, 
Khartoum, April 28 2015). In 2011, to add to these internal divisions, Bashir 
announced the creation of a small force called the Strategic Unit, which was 
to be in charge of crushing any revolt against the regime (International Crisis 
Group 2011: 14). This fragmentation of the security organs goes even further, 
as “the police are broken into regular, public order and popular police, the 
central contingency force and transhumance route police. The Jaali section of 
the upper elite reportedly has a private force (the “Precious Stones”) under 
Bashir’s command”  (International Crisis Group 2011: 14). One actually has 
only to wander around Khartoum a little to see this fragmentation incarnated 
in the many different uniforms that can be spotted along the streets. 
This can be interpreted in different ways. While some might relate it to 
internal power struggles, with each faction arming itself to the teeth, the idea 
that it might be a sign of the regime’s weakness needs to be approached care-
fully. According to some of the interviewees, these factions are part of the 
regime’s policy of deceit. Referring to an attempted coup in 2014, one stated 
that the perpetrators were later released because “they are part of the sys-
tem (interview, rebel leader, Khartoum, April 29 2015)”, while another 
explained that: 
“All these people who are ruling the country are united, but they behave as if 
they are divided… It is a kind of deception, the message that there is a hope they 
are going to collapse. But this collapse, which might come, as a consequence of 
their fragmentation or conlicts, is itself being used to intimidate the Sudanese or 
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the international community. If we are to ight each other, this would bring hell to 
Sudan. And not only Sudan, to the whole region”. (interview, professor, Khartoum, 
March 22 2015)
Another interpretation of the fragmentation of the security apparatus, and 
the one favoured here, is that this is part of a counterbalancing strategy that is 
not, however, necessarily consciously implemented as such. Recent literature 
has attempted to describe the strategies dictators use to avoid coups, which are 
named coup-prooing strategies. The army in particular is looked upon suspi-
ciously, as it is the actor that has the means to implement a coup. One of the 
most common practices used is counterbalancing, which consists in dividing 
the army into different organizations, for instance by creating paramilitary 
forces (Belkin and Schofer 2005; Lee 2005; Powell 2012). These groups will 
then compete with each other, for funding, for example. The creation of the 
PDF, the reinforcement of the NISS, and the subsequent creation of different 
bodies all contribute towards curtailing the power of the army, while at the 
same time making sure that no organization becomes completely overbearing. 
While it is true that the extent of the NISS’s powers seems to contradict this the-
ory, and that this interpretation needs more investigation, it is not unthinkable 
that the process of counterbalancing might be derailed as the years go by, with 
one organization taking the lead over the others. At the same time, given the 
near impossibility of knowing what happens within these organizations, it may 
very well be true that the NISS is not as omnipotent as it is thought to be.
From expandable allies to last bulwark of the regime
In any event, the Janjaweed, who became the government’s allies during 
the conlict, are acquiring importance within the whole apparatus, and gain-
ing power to a point where they may actually be counterbalancing that of 
the NISS, even though the relationship between the two remains unclear. 
According to one interviewee, it is the NISS that orchestrated the repression 
of the demonstrations that took place in September 2013 in many large cit-
ies, with the Janjaweed executing the orders (interview, rebel leader, 
Khartoum, April 29 2015). The Janjaweed have actually been brought in 
from Darfur to be stationed on the outskirts of Khartoum. While some claim 
that they are only there for training purposes (interview, retired army oficer, 
April 28 2015), others argue they are there to stay, a claim that seems to be 
corroborated by recent events. Indeed, according to the Enough Project 
NGO, the Janjaweed were reorganized in 2014, and a part of them was 
transformed into a new organization, the Rapid Support Forces, led by 
Mohamed Hamdan Daglo (also known as Hemeti), and integrated into the 
NISS (Kumar and Ismail 2014). According to Ahmed Hussain Adam (2014), 
in May 2014, “Mr Bashir used the force in Khartoum – not for the irst time, 
but on an unprecedented scale – deploying at least 3,000 of the RSF’s 
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estimated 10,000 ighters in the capital and placing it under the direct com-
mand of the NISS”. This situation has fuelled tensions in these 
neighbourhoods, with reports of clashes between the local population and 
the repackaged Janjaweed (Sudan Tribune 2014; Sudan Tribune 2015). 
Analysing the government’s composition after the 2015 elections, Ali and 
Hussain Adam (2015) further argue that the Janjaweed are now one of the 
main pillars of the regime. The members of this government “are either army 
generals or NISS oficers, or maintain strong connections with the NISS, the 
SAF, and the Janjaweed”. Hemeti secured some key positions for his relatives 
and supporters at different levels of the government, meaning that “Hemeti 
and his Janjaweed militia (the RSF) have been given the upper hand in the 
new government and crowned as Bashir’s personal army” (Ali and Hussain 
Adam 2015). This indeed raises the question of the control of the NISS over 
the Janjaweed, which seems more and more in doubt. 
Undoubtedly the Janjaweed, or at least a part of them, are becoming an 
increasingly vital part of the winning coalition. The way this militia is used also 
relects the regime’s governing techniques. According to a Professor at the 
University of Khartoum, one of the devices the regime is using to ensure its 
survival is intimidation, which for the government means showing the Sudanese 
that if the regime falls, the situation is going to become even worse, a threat 
that is especially effective with the rise of ISIS in neighbouring countries. Here, 
intimidation is intrinsically related to the use of coercion, with the idea that “if 
we [the regime] are threatened, we are going to destroy everything, everything 
is going to explode. So a lot of Sudanese now (…) they will tell you that yes, it 
is better” (interview, professor, Khartoum, March 22 2015). The deployment of 
the Janjaweed serves a speciic purpose here: it sends a message that if people 
try to oppose the regime in ways that are considered to be too overt, they will 
pretty much let the dogs out, and if they are toppled, these people will have no 
one to control them and all hell will break loose. The government’s reaction 
when popular demonstrations took place in Khartoum in 2013 therefore served 
as a sort of reminder that the status quo is preferable:
The irst day there is very minor response from the government. On the 
second day, even some police and military began to send cordial messages to 
the people on the streets. But on the third day, as the President himself put it 
in the TV, they have recourse to what they called…They said for the irst day 
we allowed the people to express their…and the second day we saw that they 
began to destroy public and private properties. And that is why, on the third 
day we switch to…the Janjaweed, with their land cruisers, with these … and 
with guns and they…250 people died. Students, workers and the like. And 
that is how they put…and this was a very strong message. We are going to kill 
as much as possible if you continue to be on the streets. They are using this 
device very effectively and a lot of people on the street, ordinary people, they 
do believe that this government is bloody and they can kill (interview, profes-
sor, Khartoum, March 22 2015).
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CONCLUDING REMARKS: AMBIGUOUS ALLIES
Managing a winning coalition is a tricky business. One has to balance fac-
tions to give them power with one hand, while making sure with the other 
that they do not start to feel too emboldened, to the point of fomenting a 
coup. As they reach the epicentre of power and make themselves less and less 
expendable, the Janjaweed’s leaders may start to get ideas the regime might 
ind distasteful. This seems to be the case with Musa Hilal, who began his 
transformation from local leader to a politician of national stature at the end 
of the last decade. In 2008, he was nominated as a special advisor to the 
President. Then, after gaining a certain amount of prominence, he defected 
from the NCP in 2014 and launched his own party, the Sudanese Awakening 
Revolutionary Council (SARC) (International Crisis Group 2015: 11). He 
simultaneously made a decisive move to take control of gold mining in the 
Jebel Amer area of North Darfur. In April 2014, the Sudanese Ministry of 
Minerals awarded the concession for the exploration of gold deposits in the 
area to the MAM Group, a Sudanese industrial group, a decision to which 
Hilal replied by warning the company not to come without the agreement of 
the area’s local and tribal authorities (Radio Dabanga 2014a). In fact, he had 
actually created a management board for the mine. It was said during a meet-
ing that “the responsibility for protection of the gold mine lies with the 
management board, and not with the regular forces” (Radio Dabanga 2014b). 
On this occasion, Hilal reportedly called on the Sudanese to ight the regime 
(Tubiana 2014; Radio Dabanga 2014b). Relations with the regime became 
strained, and looked to be beyond repair when he gave the regime an ultima-
tum in early 2015: either the government responded to the SARC’s demands 
– which were probably about the gold, although little speciic information is 
available – or it would face unspeciied consequences. He then instructed his 
followers to boycott and obstruct the election in Darfur (Sudan Democracy 
First 2015). In February, however, the government apparently accepted his 
demands and signed a memorandum of understanding with the SARC. Hilal 
inally endorsed Bashir’s candidacy and even mobilized his troops, this time 
to pressure voters. Perhaps in order to further conirm his loyalty to the regime, 
the long-time governor of North Darfur, Osman Youssif Kibir, whose troops 
fought Hilal’s, has recently been dismissed. His daughter’s wedding to Idriss 
Deby, the Chadian President and a regional power broker, in 2012 might have 
also reinforced Hilal’s position. 
Hilal’s behaviour demonstrates the porosity of the insider/outsider dichot-
omy, and how easily these deining lines can be crossed. More than this, 
“border-straddling” is a fully-ledged political strategy in Sudan: Hilal is not 
the irst personality to blithely switch sides in order to pressure the govern-
ment into meeting his requests. This undoubtedly ties in with the idea that 
factions within the regime are not much more than power devices created for 
the purpose of cutting a larger slice of the national cake. In the end, no faction 
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is interested in overthrowing the system, because each beneits from the mar-
ginalizing power structure that forms the cornerstone of the regime. It should 
not be forgotten, however, that this structure did not emerged suddenly in 
1989: it is irmly rooted in decades of self-serving, inequality-producing poli-
tics that go back to the colonial era (see, for instance, Ahmed 2004; Deng 
2010; Vezzadini 2011). 
For now, the Janjaweed’s rise to prominence has not turned into a caution-
ary tale, and decades of deceitful politics should make any analyst of Sudanese 
politics wary of spotting signs of the regime’s weakness in any kind of internal 
squabble. If we analyse the Janjaweed’s positioning and trajectory – and more 
speciically those of their leaders – we can see how the time of the civil war 
has been exploited by the regime to empower new allies, or to be more pre-
cise, old ones who had been at the periphery of the regime’s core. This goes to 
demonstrate not only the lexibility of the winning coalition in Sudan, but also 
the stability of the regime’s survival strategies, which rely on violence and a 
capacity to ind opportunity in any challenge. The war is not necessarily a 
moment distinct from that of “normal politics”, as the same dynamics persist: 
counterbalancing is implemented, loyalties are bought, and speciic groups of 
people are removed from inluential positions. The fact that war may become 
politics as usual may nonetheless have unexpected consequences, as people 
who have committed terrible abuses are never held responsible, and are even 
rewarded. This is very clear not only when one looks at the Janjaweed, but also 
when one studies the rebels. Through the power-sharing devices that are a part 
of every peace agreement nowadays, some rebels have gained access to prom-
inent positions within the government. Furthermore, peace agreements are 
negotiated and signed one after the other, with the latest one integrating the 
groups that spoiled the previous one. This demonstrates that the use of violence 
is an eficient means of having one’s your demands met. Hence, at the local 
level, more and more groups and sub-groups have started to acquire weapons 
for themselves, having noted how power-sharing seems to work in Sudan 
(Bashir Ali Adi 2014). This process actually explains to a large extent not only 
why ighting is still under way in Darfur, but also why this situation does not 
threaten the government, since groups begin to ight each other for a share of 
power that in the end is always allocated by the government. Furthermore, this 
fragmentation means that the government can always ind new allies by play-
ing the “divide-and-conquer” game over and over again. Here, instability does 
not preclude authoritarian resilience: it fuels it. 
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